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In this paper, I deal with David Gauthier’s interpretation of Kant’s practical reason. 
Gauthier argues that happiness plays a unifying role in practical reason and that this 
function must be seen as a clear hint of the unity of reason. I discuss some suggestions 
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1.  Introduction 
 
David Gauthier has often interpreted his own intellectual 
work as a response to the challenges of the philosophical 
tradition. The figure of this Canadian philosopher is 
interesting in many respects. From a theoretical point of view, 
his work on the social contract is unanimously considered of 
the greatest importance
1
. Gauthier’s use of the concept of 
constrained maximization is considered as a brilliant response 
to the problem of cooperation; his generalization of the 
prisoner’s dilemma is held as highly original and thirty years 
after his formulation still arouses intense discussions
2
. From 
the point of view of the philosophical style Gauthier is 
particularly interesting because he has associated his name 
with some original interpretations of eminent philosophers of 
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interpretations are not philological and Gauthier does not 
even seem very interested in surveying the secondary 
literature, not even the most important or most recent. As he 
says in the recent book on Rousseau, there is no need to 
justify what is a personal reading. However, I think we have 
to be suspicious of this autobiographical and minimalistic 
consideration. The autobiography is often the road to self-
absolution, even when it takes the shape of a reassuring 
minimalism, as in this account of Gauthier’s motivation that 
led him to his personal reading of Rousseau. The 
opportunities for reading the philosophers of the past, that 
Gauthier questions, are rooted in a more general 
philosophical strategy, that is to seek confirmation of the 
theories that he defends or to test them in the light of 
retrospective alternatives. This is the meaning of his 
confrontation with Hobbes and Hume, in the case of the 
social contract, or with Kant, regarding his «theory of 
morality as part of the rational choice theory», according to 
an expression that had been used by Rawls to describe his 
theory of justice, but that can correctly describe Gauthier’s 
approach to morality and political cooperation, too. 
In these pages I will deal with a case that has to do with 
this last aspect of the philosophy of Gauthier, mediated by 
its interpretation of Kant, as it has been issued in his essay 
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2.  Happiness and choices 
 
The intention of Gauthier is interpretative in a sense admittedly 
problematic, and certainly not for the first time. For example, 
in the case of Hume, Gauthier intended to show that Hume is 
not akin to the utilitarian tradition, but he should be read as a 
contractarian thinker. In the case of Kant, the philosophical 
intention is certainly not less original, since the intention is to 
give a new reading of Theorems I and II of the Critique of 
Practical Reason, which is openly subversive. Gauthier, in fact, 
say he does not pretend to give an interpretation that 
corresponds to the current standards of adherence to the text: 
rather than overthrowing an interpretative tradition, he wants to 
subvert even what Kant himself thought, outlining, instead, 
what Kant would have had to think. «A reinterpretation 
exploits subversive elements and present ideas in a text to lead 
the reader in a direction manifestly different from and even 
opposed to that in which the author seeks to go. But this new 
direction is not randomly selected.» The interpretative ambition 
does not stop here: Gauthier believes that this strategy should 
lead to a better understanding of the rationality inside moral 
behavior. «Fidelity to the text is sacrificed, not for the mere 
commentator’s delectation, but in a philosophic causes». 
 
Gauthier assumes the philosophical background of practical 
philosophy of Kant, in order to reject the two theorems of 
practical reason, in the light of some prerequisites of 
kantianism which are part of the Critique of Pure Reason. It 
is clear that we are already beyond Kant himself, since this 
is a interpretative hypothesis that should be rejected in the 
light of the first lines of the Critique of Practical Reason.  
 
«Why this Critique is not entitled a Critique of Pure 
Practical Reason but simply a Critique of Practical Reason 
generally, although its parallel with the speculative seems 
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to require the first, is sufficiently explained in this treatise. I 
has merely to shown that there is pure practical reason, 
and for this purpose it criticizes reason’s entire practical 
faculty. If it succeeds in this it has no need to criticize the 
pure faculty itself in order to see whether reason is merely 
making a claim in which it presumptuously oversteps itself 




The problem, however, is not taking seriously this 
parallelism, which, if read literally, produces similarities 
and not intersections, but «to lead you to a truer 
understanding of the role of reason in ethics. Kant is to 
serve as an unwilling recruit in this task»
9
. 
The two theorems of practical reason are intended to 
eliminate any empirical determination as a determining 
motivation of moral action. The first theorem, in fact, says, 
«[a]ll practical principles that presuppose an object (matter) 
of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will 
are, without exception, empirical and can furnish no 
practical laws»
10
. The second theorem states that «[a]ll 
material practical principles as such are, without exception, 
of one and the same kind and come under the general 
principle of self-love or one’s own happiness»
11
.  
For Kant, from the point of view of morality, it is not 
possible to unify the manifold material given in the 
experience with the empirical concept taken from this same 
experience. Let us think about desire. The desire needs an 
imaginative representation which builds in our mind the 
image of a singular object. «For the determining ground of 
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choice is then the representation of an object and that 
relation of the representation to the subject by which the 
faculty of desire I determined to realize the object»
12
. The 
principle of desire is, in other words, always empirical. It is 
also difficult to consider it as a principle in the sense of 
being a rule of unification of the empirical, since we desire a 
particular object. If unification happens, this happens 
because in the practical field one must go beyond the 
empirical use.  
 
«As finite beings, lacking self-sufficiency, we have desires; 
as rational beings, we unite our conception of these desires 
in thought and so conceive of happiness as the proper 
object of desire. Rationality, applied to finitude, 
necessitates the idea of the satisfaction of all our desires 




Gauthier’s idea is that, if there is a rational faculty which is 
the origin of the action, namely the will, and since this is 
defined by Kant as nothing more than practical reason, we 
should expect even here some concepts that unify data 
experience, as in the case of pure theoretical reason. It is 
surprising, however, that Kant does not provide any of these 
concepts
14
. Actually, Gauthier thinks that Kant had 
effectively provide a practical pure concept, but has not had 
the courage to think it consequently as the unifying principle 
of moral experience. This concept is happiness and Gauthier 
asks for a deduction – that is a justification, in kantian 
jargon –, stemming from the multiplicity of desires. The 
analogy with the theoretical knowledge is revealing:  
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«As space and time are the conditions of our speculative 
apprehension of objects, so need, we may suppose, is the 
condition of our practical apprehension. Apart from need, 
objects would not be grasped by us as of interest or 
concern; knowledge of them would be possible but would 




Gauthier believes that this is a feasible task and that does 
not give raise to the objections which are usually raised 
against it. For example, this: we know the desires of the 
agents from their choices, and these choices reveal different 
orders of preferences, which should make us doubt about 
the possibility of unifying them through a practical law.  
Gauthier’s response to this objection is twofold. (1) It is 
true that an indefinite number of choices not always reveals 
a well-defined order of individual preferences, and not only 
because we cannot access to the intentions of the agent, 
either directly (introducing us in his head), or indirectly (by 
deduction from his actions), but also because in the time-
sequence of the choices, the strategic coherence of 
identifying an order of preferences is a requirement that 
sometimes remains unknown to the same agent. Gauthier 
thinks that this does not in any way affect the idea of 
happiness as an unifying concept.  
 
«The actor’s desires must be so related that they determine 
a preferential ordering of the set of alternative possible 
actions, from which she may then select a maximal 
element. The familiar ideas of the theory of rational choice 
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(2) Happiness is not simply given as a natural need for all 
sentient and rational beings, but as what unifies all desires, 
that is happiness is the sufficient and necessary reason of the 
existence of the same concept of desire.  
 
«Happiness, the satisfaction of all desires, is given as the 
end of action not, as Kant seems to have supposed, by 
natural necessity, but as the result of the activity of the will, 
or practical reason, in unifying the manifold of desire to 
determine a single action. The action so determined takes 




These quotations can be read as a commentary on what Kant 
says in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals about 
the concept of practical law. Kant writes that  
 
«We shall thus have to investigate entirely a priori the 
possibility of a categorical imperative, since we do not here 
have the advantage of its reality being given in experience, 
so that the possibility would be necessary not to establish it 
but merely to explain it. In the meantime, however, we can 
see this much: that […] by contrast the categorical 
imperative alone has the tenor of a practical law; all the 
others can indeed be called principles of the will but not 
laws, since what it is necessary to do merely for achieving a 
discretionary purpose can be regarded as in itself contingent 
and we can always be released from the precept if we give 
up the purpose; on the contrary, the unconditional 
command leaves the will no discretion with respect to the 
opposite, so that it alone brings with it that necessity which 
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The existential condition of each of us is to have always a 
variety of needs and desires. These existential objectives do 
not clearly manifest all together at the same time, but they 
usually overlap in different circumstances of the life of the 
agents. Some of these cannot occur together, because they 
are mutually incompatible, in the sense that the presence of 
one excludes that of another one. Therefore, it is not 
possible to identify each of these individual goals with 
happiness. The identification would be an undue and 
inordinate simplification. Moreover, we cannot even think 
that happiness is a desire or a need, among others, since 
happiness is a goal and a purpose, namely a mode of 
selection of desires and needs, each of them chosen 
according to their ability to make us reach that goal. The 
function of happiness is not for Gauthier simply 
instrumental, but rather is an ordering function. Needs and 
the desires lack of this ordering function.  
 
«In a single choice the existence of a maximal element is an 
analytic necessity; the chosen element may always be 
interpreted as maximal. But a series of choices may not 
reveal a single preferential ordering of alternative possible 
actions. Taken together, they may not express the unified 




Happiness is, therefore, that pure concept one should look 
for in the field of practical reason. This is what Kant have 
deliberately failed to recognize. In Anthropology from the 
Pragmatic Point of View, however, Kant hints at this 
ordering function of universal happiness, as linked to the 
ideal of progress of mankind, when he suggests that if wars 
testify to a destructive impulse, this does not prevent 
 
 




rational creatures, with the gradual increase of their culture 
despite the wars, to offer to mankind for centuries to come 
the clear prospect of a state of happiness irreversible
20
. 
This universal perspective of the human race, however, 
is certainly not interesting in this circumstance for Gauthier. 
This kind of unification, by mean of a future regulatory 
perspective, is postponed sine die, while for Gauthier what 
is important to happiness is the ability to make sense of the 
actions of each individual. Indeed, behind this idea of 
Gauthier there is a whole conception of the individual as a 
strategic agent. For this strategic condition it is not possible 
to be an individual who simply satisfies his/her immediate 
needs and desires, without any other additional unifying 
perspective (deciding, if possible, to satisfy his/her own 
current needs and desires is itself ultimately a unifying 
perspective). Of course there is the problem of knowing 
what is required for being something that gives unity to a 
life. It is not sufficient that there is always a goal, because, 
after all, also sponges pursue their goals with unfailing 
constancy. Two further conditions, lacking in animals
21
, 
must be satisfied: (1) the subject must be able to make a 
semantic representation of this goal, relatively constant over 
time, and (2) this representation refers to an actor who is 
also relatively constant in time
22
. These conditions are 
background necessary conditions to the concept of rational 
individual, even if they are not sufficient conditions. In this 
sense, they apply to a concept of individual agent that is a 
transcendental concept. I think it is clear the analogy with 
the transcendental unity of apperception. As the concept of 
‘I think’ is necessary to give meaning to our experience – 
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that is, to think about the experience as ours, because 
otherwise we would have, Kant says, representations 
without thinking –, so it is necessary a unified concept of 
agent to make sense of our actions. This concept, however, 
must show something that must be common in every action. 
This cannot be but an intention. The unity of reason 
mentioned in the title of Gauthier’s essay it is to be 
understood in this way. 
 
 
3.  Unity 
 
But this kind of transcendental unity of apperception in 
action (the unified semantic representation of an individual 
who is acting) is really a necessary and sufficient condition? 
Happiness is really the unifying function of desires, and this 
function must be thought in strategic terms? For Kant 
happiness was just an accessory condition of any good 
action. Kant would certainly not have signed the statement 
of Lev Tolstoj at the beginning of Anna Karenina, «Happy 
families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its 
own way», because happiness does not have the unifying 
power of rational action. As Kant writes: 
 
«Now in a being that has reason and a will, if the proper 
end of nature were its preservation, its welfare, in a word its 
happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad 
arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry 
out this purpose. For all the actions that the creature has to 
perform for this purpose, and the whole rule of its conduct, 
would be marked out for it far more accurately by instinct, 
and that end would have thereby been attained much more 
surely than it ever can be by reason; and if reason should 
have been given, over and above, to this favored creature, it 




constitution of its nature, to admire this, to delight in it, and 
to be grateful for it to the beneficent cause, but not to 
submit its faculty of desire to that weak and deceptive 
guidance and meddle with nature’s purpose. In a word, 
nature would have taken care that reason should not break 
forth into practical use and have the presumption, with its 
weak insight, to think out for itself a plan for happiness and 
for the means of attaining it. Nature would have taken upon 
itself the choice not only of ends but also of means and, 





It seems clear that the unifying power of the reason is given 
by a personal rational intention and not by the fact that 
instinct achieves more precisely its target. But, according to 
Kant, it would not be even a necessary condition. Just think 
an agent acting in accordance with the principles of act-
utilitarianism. 
Kant and Gauthier both share the idea of a moral law as 
a semantic structure that does make sense of the manifold 
elements of the empirical experience, but for the former this 
law is something that can exist outside human cooperation; 
for the latter is something that show the irrationality of 
maximizing without any restriction. For Gauthier:  
 
«If an actor brings her need-based desires into a single 
framework, so that they direct her to her maximum overall 
satisfaction, then she is not inevitably determined to 
respond directly to each of her needs. As we have seen, the 
necessity of happiness as the object of desire is not natural 
but practical, determined by the unifying activity of 
practical reason. Thus such an actor is autonomous, acting 
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on the basis of the practical law given by her exercise of 
practical reason. If there is a problem in reconciling 
practical necessity with natural necessity, or human 
freedom with causality, then it arises as much for the actor 
who acts autonomously to maximize her own happiness as 
for the actor who acts to fulfill the moral law. Kant’s 





But the content of this semantic structure is very different 
and it is thanks to a kind of petition principii that Gauthier 
believes that he has found the theoretical exit to the kantian 
skepticism about the ability to find a moral law in the 
material principles of the faculty of desire: the law of 
practical reason is not so much in the maximization of 
happiness, as in the ability to pose constraints on the pursuit 
of happiness. That constraint that, if anything, for Kant 
would have been only an additional ancillary condition to 
the fulfillment of duty (acting morally, the agent becomes 
worthy of happiness), for Gauthier becomes a necessary 
condition to release the rational actor from the contingency 
of satisfaction of desires. 
Kant would have considered this move neither 
persuasive, nor conform to the universality that we have to 
ask to the moral law. He thought that a law of practical 
reason based on happiness would produce practical 
destructive effects. If everyone were entitled to pursue his 
own well-being, there could be no agreement between the 
agents, if not in an entirely contingent way. According to 
Kant, even when an agreement is produced, this would not 
be necessarily a desiderable outcome. The example given by 
Kant is that of a married couple who decide to break the 
 
 




union. The agreement of the two will seems here perfect, 
but the result will not certainly produce harmony. 
For Gauthier, as for Kant, neither utilitarianism nor 
selfishness can provide a solid basis for moral behavior. This 
solid base can instead be obtained if the agents are able to 
provide a rational rule on the conditions of choice and a 
rational rule on the outcomes. Of course, Gauthier believes to 
be in possession of these two rules which are as follows: (1) 
everyone should maximize their own happiness, given the 
actions of other agents, and (2) everyone should maximize 
their own happiness, given the amount of happiness received 
from other agents
25
. This rules are not only extremely 
demanding, but they are inapplicable, because they can sketch 
their effective content just taking the point of view of an 
omniscient observer. In fact, there is something extremely 
indeterminate in their formulation, and it seems very difficult 
to specify some conditions in such a way as to make them 
manageable in the moral calculus. I especially refer to the 
notion of ‘other’. Even when with ‘other’ we must understand 
‘other human beings’, the kind of being we share the ability 
to form semantic representation with (while this ability is not 
present in animals), how to use this notion remains 
completely undetermined, because it remains entirely 
undetermined how it must be further specified. ‘Other’ cannot 
be regarded as a primitive term in any moral conception, even 
in those extremely formalized. Who is the other? On the one 
hand the response appears to be extremely simple: the other is 
a human being who does not occupy my same physical space 
and that is capable of cognitive performance comparable with 
mine, but, in another sense, this is only the condition of an 
effective communication and not the sufficient condition of 
any moral cooperation. 
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Kant could agree that here we have some unifying rules 
of desires, but probably he would object that it is not clear 
whether these rule specify normative or descriptive 
conditions. Are they really rules that everyone must follow, 
or rather are they rules that everyone already follows? 
Putting together the words ‘action’, ‘rational’, ‘rules’ does 
not produce something morally relevant from the point of 
view of Kant, because these words could simply identify 
general laws that are maxims of action, but not moral a 
priori laws. But Gauthier’s rules may tell us something else, 
that is the prevalence of the order of individual preferences, 
and the very fact that this order is to be understood as a 
belief about the future course of his/her actions and the 
future course of actions of the actors, which presumably are 
affected by the expected results of my actions. Kant would 




4.  Strategic happiness 
 
These considerations would seem to substantiate the kantian 
idea that what form our idea of happiness is taken from the 
senses, from the material given to us by our experience of 
the world: and this, according to Kant, means to deny that it 
can dictate any valid law for practical reason, since a 
practical law must be given to the practical reason only by 
itself. Therefore, when Kant write that  
 
«Thus, it is found, for example, that we can find satisfaction 
in the mere exercise of our powers, in consciousness of our 
strength of soul in overcoming obstacles opposed to our 
plans, in cultivating our talents of spirit, and so forth, and 
we correctly call these joys and delights more refined 









he means that we are playing with empirical feeling to a 
higher level. So again, it is not possible to derive practical 
moral laws from such mental states. 
For Gauthier, the error of Kant does not consist in 
adopting too narrow criteria for the formulation of laws in 
the field of action, but in conceiving happiness simply like 
other desires
27
. Happiness, on the contrary, is neither a 
desire among others nor the particular object of a desire, but 
the general strategy in the actions of the subject. We want to 
achieve some purpose, possess some object, succeed in a 
certain task because these tasks give us happiness, or 
satisfaction or utility. The use of three different terms does 
not seem to change the substance of the problem: they show 
in each case that the unification is that of a desired purpose 
through a multiplicity of forms. 
Gauthier’s thesis is that happiness is the unifying 
element of desires, so by its very structure when we look at 
happiness we are looking at something other than particular 
wishes, desires, goals. I think that there is always some 
circularity at stake in the arguments that are concerned with 
happiness, desires, needs. This should not be surprising that 
much since the concept of happiness is tightly woven with 
those of need and desire. We want something and/or we 
need to reach a certain goal because it gives us happiness, 
but the happiness that we reach – if and when we reach it – 
is the fulfillment of initial need and desire, and forms an 
important part of our impulse to act. It could be argued that 
this circularity is unavoidable and inescapable, because it is 
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part of our way of conceptualizing needs, desires, happiness. 
However, one should not think that we are talking about a 
single object. The idea that happiness is a unifying strategy 
might suggest that, after all, happiness is a single object. But 
from a strategic point of view, happiness looks like more as 
a process than as an object. From his point of view, 
however, Kant had strong reasons to refuse an unification 
drawn from the empirical world to shape practical moral 
laws. As a matter of fact, the skeptical objection managed 
by Kant, obviously for not skeptical purposes, can be 
repeated against Gauthier: happiness is an empty concept 
that can be filled in any way. Kant would have had very 
strong doubts that taking a strategic point of view – true 
pillar of the criticism of Gauthier and his idea of unity of 
reason – can give rise to a single rational outcome and not to 
a lacking of moral normativity, masked by the supposed 
uniqueness of a procedure in action. 
But perhaps at this point we must ask what are the 
underlying reasons that justify Gauthier’s subversive 
reinterpretation of Kant, which overlaps theoretical reason 
with practical reason. One motivation is clearly expressed in 
another paper, that is Gauthier’s Why Contractarianism?
28
. 
According to Gauthier, moral theories, that want to answer 
the skeptical challenge, can be divided into two groups. On 
the one hand, there is the attempt to justify morality from 
the inside. For this view, morality should provide reasons 
for action, which are independent from desires, personal 
goals, interests. But what other reasons has a person to act?  
  
«From the standpoint of the agent, moral considerations 
present themselves as constraining his choices and actions, 
in ways independent of his desires, aims, and interests. […] 
 
 




For it reveals clearly what is in question – the ground of 
constraint. This ground seems absent from our present 
world view. And so we ask, what reason can a person have 
for recognizing and accepting a constraint that is 
independent of his desires and interests? He may agree that 
such a constraint would be morally justified; he would have 
a reason for accepting it if he had a reason for accepting 
morality. But what justifies paying attention to morality, 
rather than dismissing is as an appendage of outworn 




The kantian practical reason is the most obvious example of 
this way of founding morals. John Rawls’s theory of justice 
is another kantian way to defend a kind of normativism 
linked to principles and to a specific moral psychology. 
Gauthier thinks that internalism faces a foundational crisis, 
but that that crisis is not necessarily the crisis of morality. 
What we need is for Gauthier an external foundation, that is 
a theory of constraints. This means that if there is a practical 
reason, it must be possible, in principle, acting in such a 
way that the conditions of cooperative rationality are 
fulfilled. This means that, again, in order to fulfill this task, 




The kantian interpretation of Gauthier is clearly 
subversive, but for reasons different from those put forward 
by the author. More simply, it is a deliberate 
misunderstanding of the practical philosophy of Kant. For 
the purpose of Gauthier is to show that there is not 
discontinuity between theoretical reason and practical 
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reason, and that the line of continuity must be sought both in 
happiness and in the principle of minimax relative 
concession, according to which  
 
«each bargainer will be most concerned with the 
concessions that she makes from her ideal outcome relative 
to the concessions that others make. If she sees her 
concessions as reasonable relative to the others, considering 
that she wants to ensure as much for herself as she can 
while securing agreement (and thereby avoiding the zero-
point: no share of the cooperative surplus) and subsequent 
compliance from the others, then she will agree to it. What 
would then be the reasonable outcome? Gauthier argues 
that it is the outcome that minimizes the maximum relative 




How this strategy can be set apart from rule-utilitarian is not 
easy to understand, especially in light of the notations on 
Kant in Morals by Agreement. For example, when Gauthier 
discusses the choice made from the Archimedean point of 
view – which is his alternative thesis to the original position 
of Rawls – he also takes the opportunity to exhibit his 
distance from the kantian position of Rawls himself. For 
Gauthier although the ignorance of their identity precludes 
any manifestation of positive bias in agents’ choice, this is 
insufficient to ensure an equal rationality. The impartial 
selection is not the absence of concern for those who are 
involved, but the presence of an equal concern. And this 
equal concern is ensured by the purpose of the actor’s 
maximizing ideal. Although he cannot identify with anyone, 
everyone can identify with him. The impartiality of his 
choice is then showed in the character fully representative of 
 
 






. But these considerations lead us not in the 
neighborhood of Kant, but rather in humean suburbs, since 
they are fully consistent with Hume’s idea that reason is and 
must necessarily be a slave of the passions. As a matter of 
fact, Gauthier rejects, in his major work, the contiguity with 
the kantian position, since for Gauthier the kantian 
indifference to the passions is completely foreign to his 
subject
33
. Is there a discrepancy between the article from 
which we started, his idea to subvert Kant through the use of 
happiness as a strategic tool of reason, and the major work? 
The answer must be negative. According to Moral by 
Agreement, agents must act to maximize their own 
constrained utility. Since this is the rationale of their action, 
the discussion of the unifying function assigned to 
happiness assumes the entire structure of Gauthier’s 
contractual theory, a structure that he cannot find in Kant. 
For Gauthier, there are three levels in contractual theory: (a) 
the claim that rational and moral constraints are internal 
constraints. These constraints, once defined in an impartial 
way, must be included as part of the theory of rational 
choice, (b) the introduction of a special procedure, the 
purpose of which is to show that it is rational to constraint 
when others are doing the same, and (c) the assumption of 
the principles that govern the structure of impartial 
constraints: the minimax relative concession, and the 
lockean condition. 
Of these three conditions, Gauthier can find only the first 
in Kant. The others are at odds with the idea of practical 
kantian reason. In particular, if we assume the idea of a 
kantian moral duty, the conditions (b) and (c) would be like 
playing consequentialism in a deontologic frame. 
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This incompatibility between Gauthier and Kant is not due 
to what Kant would have to think and has not thought, but 
rather to the function of morality, which in Kant is not linked to 
the passions, but that works as a function of unification of the 
manifold, which is represented by the infinite number of 
opportunities to exercise of morality. However, this manifold is 
always given also as unity, that is as duty. So it follows that 
Kant cannot properly speak of moral error, but only of error in 
the action – I may be wrong in the action believing that my 
result will be consistent with my moral intention, but I cannot 
go wrong in my intention, if the intention is moral –. In 
Gauthier, however, the internal constraints of morality are the 
mirror of the external ones and are justified on the their basis, 
since they are not really independent. They are subject to a 
process of negotiation and calculation. In the world of social 
constrained cooperation they are certainly inevitable, but into 
the inner world of duty built by Kant one cannot find space for 
them. For this reason, for Kant happiness remains an empirical 
element located outside the horizon of moral duty. Kant does 
not run into a contradiction thinking that acting morally makes 
you worthy of happiness. He thought that for deserving this it 
is necessary postulating both the immortality of the soul and 
the existence of God, for moral action requires an infinite time 
to be fully consistent to the formal structure of moral duty and 
for approaching asymptotically to the union of virtue with 
happiness, represented by the idea of God. 
Gauthier’s unity of reason must conceal all these 
elements, since they cannot find space in a rational choice 
theory. So the conclusion that is perhaps more prudent to 
draw is that Gauthier’s reading of Kant is, therefore, more 
an intelligent and intentional misunderstanding that a 
subversive interpretation. A misunderstanding intending to 
show Gauthier’s own theory of the unity of reason and not 
the strength of the kantian division between theoretical 
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